We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria (α-PNE) in weighted atomic congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d. Previously it was known that d-approximate equilibria always exist, while nonexistence was established only for small constants, namely for 1.153-PNE. We improve significantly upon this gap, proving that such games in general do not haveΘ( √ d)-approximate PNE, which provides the first super-constant lower bound.
Introduction

Related Work
The origins of the systematic study of (atomic) congestion games can be traced back to the influential work of Rosenthal [29, 30] . Although Rosenthal showed the existence of congestion games without PNE, he also proved that unweighted congestion games always possess such equilibria. His proof is based on a simple but ingenious potential function argument, which up to this day is essentially still the only general tool for establishing existence of pure equilibria.
In follow-up work [14, 17, 24] , the nonexistence of PNE was demonstrated even for special simple classes of (weighted) games, including network congestion games with quadratic cost functions and games where the player weights are either 1 or 2. On the other hand, we know that equilibria do exist for affine or exponential latencies [14, 19, 27] , as well as for the class of singleton 1 games [15, 20] . Dunkel and Schulz [11] were able to extend the nonexistence instance of Fotakis et al. [14] to a gadget in order to show that deciding whether a congestion game with step cost functions has a PNE is a (strongly) NP-hard problem, via a reduction from 3-Partition.
Regarding approximate equilibria, Hansknecht et al. [18] gave instances of very simple, two-player polynomial congestion games that do not have α-PNE, for α ≈ 1.153. This lower bound is achieved by numerically solving an optimization program, using polynomial latencies of maximum degree d = 4. On the positive side, Caragiannis et al. [4] proved that d!-PNE always exist; this upper bound on the existence of α-PNE was later improved to α = d + 1 [9, 18] and α = d [3] .
Our Results and Techniques
After formalizing our model in Section 2, in Section 3 we show the nonexistence ofΘ( √ d)approximate equilibria for polynomial congestion games of degree d. This is the first superconstant lower bound on the nonexistence of α-PNE, significantly improving upon the previous constant of α ≈ 1.153 and reducing the gap with the currently best upper bound of d. More specifically (Theorem 1), for any integer d we construct congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d (and nonnegative coefficients) that do not have α-PNE, for any α < α(d) where α(d) is a function that grows as α(d) = Ω √ d ln d . To derive this bound, we had to use a novel construction with a number of players growing unboundedly as a function of d.
Next, in Section 4 we turn our attention to computational hardness constructions. Starting from a Boolean circuit, we create a gadget that transfers hard instances of the classic Circuit Satisfiability problem to (even unweighted) polynomial congestion games. Using this gadget we can immediately establish computational hardness for various computational questions of interest involving congestion games (Theorem 2). For example, we show that deciding whether a d-degree polynomial congestion game has an α-PNE in which a specific set of players play a specific strategy profile is NP-hard, even up to exponentially-approximate equilibria; more specifically, the hardness holds for any α < 3 d /2 . It is of interest to note here that our hardness gadget is gap-introducing, in the sense that the α-PNE and exact PNE of the game coincide.
In Section 5 we demonstrate how one can combine the hardness gadget of Section 4, in a black-box way, with any nonexistence instance for α-PNE, in order to derive hardness for the decision version of the existence of α-PNE (Lemma 2, Theorem 3). As a consequence, using the previous Ω √ d ln d lower bound construction of Section 3, we can show that deciding whether a (weighted) polynomial congestion has an α-PNE is NP-hard, for any α < α(d), where α(d) = Ω √ d ln d (Corollary 1). Since our hardness is established via a rather transparent, "master" reduction from Circuit Satisfiability, which in particular is parsimonious, one can derive hardness for a family of related computation problems; for example, we show that computing the number of α-approximate equilibria of a weighted polynomial congestion game is #P-hard (Corollary 2).
In Section 6 we drop the assumption on polynomial cost functions, and study the existence of approximate equilibria under arbitrary (nondecreasing) latencies as a function of the number of players n. We prove that n-player congestion games always have n-approximate PNE (Theorem 4). As a consequence, one cannot hope to derive super-constant nonexistence lower bounds by using just simple instances with a fixed number of players. In particular, this shows that the super-constant number of players in our construction in Theorem 1 is necessary. Furthermore, we pair this positive result with an almost matching lower bound (Theorem 5):
we give examples of n-player congestion games (where latencies are simple step functions with a single breakpoint) that do not have α-PNE for all α < α(n), where α(n) grows according to α(n) = Ω n ln n . Finally, inspired by our hardness construction for the polynomial case, we also give a new reduction that establishes NP-hardness for deciding whether an α-PNE exists, for any α < α(n) = Ω n ln n . Notice that now the number of players n is part of the description of the game (i.e., part of the input) as opposed to the maximum degree d for the polynomial case (which was assumed to be fixed). On the other hand though, we have more flexibility on designing our gadget latencies, since they can be arbitrary functions.
Concluding, we would like to elaborate on a couple of points. First, the reader would have already noticed that in all our hardness results the (in)approximability parameter α ranges freely within an entire interval of the form [1,α) , whereα is a function of the degree d (for polynomial congestion games) or of the number of players n; and that α,α are not part of the problem's input. It is easy to see that these features only make our results stronger, with respect to computational hardness, but also more robust. Secondly, although in this introductory section all our hardness results were presented in terms of NP-hardness, they immediately translate to NP-completeness under standard assumptions on the parameter α; e.g., if α is rational (for a more detailed discussion of this, see also the end of Section 2).
Model and Notation
A (weighted, atomic) congestion game is defined by: a finite (nonempty) set of resources E, each e ∈ E having a nondecreasing cost (or latency) function c e : R >0 −→ R ≥0 ; and a finite (nonempty) set of players N , |N | = n, each i ∈ N having a weight w i > 0 and a set of strategies S i ⊆ 2 E . If all players have the same weight, w i = 1 for all i ∈ N , the game is called unweighted. A polynomial congestion game of degree d, for d a nonnegative integer, is a congestion game such that all its cost functions are polynomials of degree at most d with nonnegative coefficients. A strategy profile (or outcome) s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) is a collection of strategies, one for each player, i.e. s ∈ S = S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n . Each strategy profile s induces a cost of C i (s) = e∈s i c e (x e (s)) to every player i ∈ N , where x e (s) = i:e∈s i w i is the induced load on resource e. An outcome s will be called α-approximate (pure Nash) equilibrium (α-PNE), where α ≥ 1, if no player can unilaterally improve her cost by more than a factor of α. Formally:
Here we have used the standard game-theoretic notation of s −i to denote the vector of strategies resulting from s if we remove its i-th coordinate; in that way, one can write s = (s i , s −i ). Notice that for the special case of α = 1, (1) is equivalent to the classical definition of pure Nash equilibria; for emphasis, we will sometimes refer to such 1-PNE as exact equilibria. If (1) does not hold, it means that player i could improve her cost by more than α by moving from s i to some other strategy s i . We call such a move α-improving. Finally, strategy s i is said to be α-dominating for player i (with respect to a fixed profile s −i ) if
In other words, if a strategy s i is α-dominating, every move from some other strategy s i to s i is α-improving. Notice that each player i can have at most one α-dominating strategy (for s −i fixed). In our proofs, we will employ a gap-introducing technique by constructing games with the property that, for any player i and any strategy profile s −i , there is always a (unique) α-dominating strategy for player i. As a consequence, the sets of α-PNE and exact PNE coincide. Finally, for a positive integer n, we will use Φ n to denote the unique positive solution of equation (x + 1) n = x n+1 . Then, Φ n is strictly increasing with respect to n, with Φ 1 = φ ≈ 1.618 (golden ratio) and asymptotically Φ n ∼ n ln n (see [9, Lemma A.3] ).
Computational Complexity
Most of the results in this paper involve complexity questions, regarding the existence of (approximate) equilibria. Whenever we deal with such statements, we will implicitly assume that the congestion game instances given as inputs to our problems can be succinctly represented in the following way:
• all player have rational weights;
• the resource cost functions are "efficiently computable"; for polynomial latencies in particular, we will assume that the coefficients are rationals; and for step functions we assume that their values and breakpoints are rationals; • the strategy sets are given explicitly. 2 There are also computational considerations to be made about the number α appearing in the definition of α-PNE. In our results (e.g., Theorems 2 and 3), we will prove NP-hardness of determining whether games have α-PNE for any arbitrary real α below the nonexistence bound, Figure 1 : Strategies of the game G d (n,k,w,β) . Resources contained in the two ellipses of the same colour correspond to the two strategies of a player. The strategies of the heavy player and light players n and i are depicted in black, grey and light grey, respectively. regardless of whether α is rational or irrational, computable or uncomputable. However, to prove NP-completeness, i.e. to prove that the decision problem belongs in NP (as in Theorem 3), we need to be able to verify, given a strategy profile and a deviation of some player, whether this deviation is an α-improving move. This can be achieved by additionally assuming that the upper Dedekind cut of α, R α = {q ∈ Q | q > α}, is a language decidable in polynomial time. In this paper we will refer to such an α as a polynomial-time computable real number. In particular, notice that rationals are polynomial-time computable; thus the NP-completeness of the α-PNE problem does hold for α rational. We refer the interested reader to Ko [22] for a detailed discussion on polynomial-time computable numbers (which is beyond the scope of our paper), as well as for a comparison with other axiomatizations using binary digits representations or convergent sequences. If, more generally, α : N −→ R is a sequence of reals (as in Theorem 6), we say that α is a polynomial-time computable real sequence if R α = {(n, q) ∈ N × Q | q > α(n)} is a language decidable in polynomial time.
The Nonexistence Gadget
In this section we give examples of polynomial congestion games of degree d, that do not have α(d)-approximate equilibria; α(d) grows as Ω √ d ln d . Fixing a degree d ≥ 2, we construct a family of games G d (n,k,w,β) , specified by parameters n ∈ N, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, w ∈ [0, 1], and β ∈ [0, 1]. In G d (n,k,w,β) there are n + 1 players: a heavy player of weight 1 and n light players 1, . . . , n of equal weights w. There are 2(n + 1) resources a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n , b 0 , b 1 , . . . , b n where a 0 and b 0 have the same cost function c 0 and all other resources a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n have the same cost function c 1 given by c 0 (x) = x k and c 1 (x) = βx d .
Each player has exactly two strategies, and the strategy sets are given by
The structure of the strategies is visualized in Figure 1 .
In the following theorem we give a lower bound on α, depending on parameters (n, k, w, β), such that games G d (n,k,w,β) do not admit an α-PNE. Maximizing this lower bound over all games in the family, we obtain a general lower bound α(d) on the inapproximability for polynomial congestion games of degree d (see (3) and its plot in Fig. 2 ). Finally, choosing specific values for the parameters (n, k, w, β), we prove that α(d) is asymptotically lower bounded by Ω( (3)) for small degrees can be found in Figure 2 .
Proof. Due to symmetries, it is enough to just consider the following two cases for the strategy profiles in game G d (n,k,w,β) described above: Case 1: The heavy player is alone on resource a 0 . This means that every light player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} must have chosen strategy {b 0 , a i }. Thus the heavy player incurs a cost of c 0 (1) + nc 1 (1 + w); while, deviating to strategy {b 0 , . . . , b n }, she would incur a cost of c 0 (1 + nw) + nc 1 (1). The improvement factor can then be lower bounded by
Case 2: The heavy player shares resource a 0 with at least one light player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus player i incurs a cost of at least c 0 (1 + w) + c 1 (w); while, deviating to strategy {b 0 , a i }, she would incur a cost of at most c 0 (nw) + c 1 (1 + w). The improvement factor can then be lower bounded by
In order for the game to not have an α-PNE, it is enough to guarantee that both ratios are greater than α. Maximizing these ratios over all games in the family, yields the lower bound in the statement of the theorem,
For small values of d the above quantity can be computed numerically (see Fig. 2 ); in particular, for d = 2, 3, 4 this yields the same lower bounds as in Hansknecht et al. [18] , since n = 1 is the optimal choice. Next we prove the asymptotics α(d) = Ω √ d ln d . To that end, we take the following choice of parameters:
One can check that this choice satisfies k ∈ {1, . . . , d} (for d ≥ 4) and w, β ∈ [0, 1]. We can bound the expressions appearing in (3) as follows.
In the Appendix, we prove (Lemma 3) that the final quantity in (5) converges to 1 as d → ∞; in particular, it is upper bounded by 4 for d large enough. Thus, we can lower bound the ratios of (3) as
, (from (4), (5) and large d)
.
(from (6) and (7)) This proves the asymptotics and the bound α(d) ≥ 
The Hardness Gadget
In this section we construct an unweighted polynomial congestion game from a Boolean circuit.
In the α-PNE of this game the players emulate the computation of the circuit. This gadget will
(c) directed acyclic graph be used in reductions from Circuit Satisfiability to show NP-hardness of several problems related to the existence of approximate equilibria with some additional properties. For example, deciding whether a congestion game has an α-PNE where a certain set of players choose a specific strategy profile (Theorem 2).
Circuit Model
We consider Boolean circuits consisting of NOT gates and 2-input NAND gates only. We assume that the two inputs to every NAND gate are different. Otherwise we replace the NAND gate by a NOT gate, without changing the semantics of the circuit. We further assume that every input bit is connected to exactly one gate and this gate is a NOT gate. See Figure 3a for a valid circuit. In a valid circuit we replace every NOT gate by an equivalent NAND gate, where one of the inputs is fixed to 1. See the replacement of gates g 5 , g 4 and g 2 in the example in Figure 3b . Thus, we look at circuits of 2-input NAND gates where both inputs to a NAND gate are different and every input bit of the circuit is connected to exactly one NAND gate where the other input is fixed to 1. A circuit of this form is said to be in canonical form.
For a circuit C and a vector x ∈ {0, 1} n we denote by C(x) the output of the circuit on input x. We model a circuit C in canonical form as a directed acyclic graph. The nodes of this graph correspond to the input bits x 1 , . . . , x n , the gates g 1 , . . . , g K and a node 1 for all fixed inputs. There is an arc from a gate g to a gate g if the output of g is input to gate g and there are arcs from the fixed input and all input bits to the connected gates. We index the gates in reverse topological order, so that all successors of a gate g k have a smaller index and the output of gate g 1 is the output of the circuit. Denote by δ + (v) the set of the direct successors of node v. Then we have |δ + (x i )| = 1 for all input bits x i and δ + (g k ) ⊆ {g k | k < k} for every gate g k . See Figure 3 for an example of a valid circuit, its canonical form and the corresponding directed acyclic graph.
Translation to Congestion Game Fix some integer d ≥ 2 and a parameter µ > 1 + 3 d+ d /2 . From a valid circuit in canonical form with input bits x 1 , . . . , x n , gates g 1 , . . . , g K and the extra input fixed to 1, we construct a polynomial congestion game G d µ of degree d. There are n input players X 1 , . . . , X n for every input bit, a static player P for the input fixed to 1, and K gate players G 1 , . . . , G K for the output bit of every gate. G 1 is sometimes called output player as g 1 corresponds to the output C(x).
The idea is that every input and every gate player has a zero and a one strategy, corresponding to the respective bit being 0 or 1. In every α-PNE we want the players to emulate the computation of the circuit, i.e. the NAND semantics of the gates should be respected. For every gate g k , we introduce two resources 0 k and 1 k . The zero (one) strategy of a player consists of the 0 k (1 k ) resources of the direct successors in the directed acyclic graph corresponding to the circuit and its own 0 k (1 k ) resource (for gate players). The static player has only one strategy playing all 1 k resources of the gates where one input is fixed to 1.
Formally, we have
for the zero and one strategy of an input player X i . Recall that δ + (x i ) is the set of direct successors of x i , thus every strategy of an input player consists of exactly one resource. For a gate player G k we have the two strategies
consisting of at most k resources each. The strategy of the static player is
Notice that all 3 players related to a gate g k (gate player G k and the two players corresponding to the input bits) are different and observe that every resource 0 k and 1 k can be played by exactly those 3 players. We define the cost functions of the resources using parameter µ. The cost functions for resources 1 k are given c 1 k and for resources 0 k by c 0 k , where
This construction is inspired by the lockable circuit games in Skopalik and Vöcking [33] . Our main contribution is the use of polynomial cost functions and a simplification of introducing only 2 resources per gate (and not 3). While Skopalik and Vöcking use these games in a PLS-reduction from Circuit/FLIP, we are interested in this gadget on its own.
Properties of the Gadget For a valid circuit C in canonical form consider the game G d µ as defined above. We interpret any strategy profile s of the input players as a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1} n by setting x i = 0 if s X i = s 0 X i and x i = 1 otherwise. The gate players are said to follow the NAND semantics in a strategy profile, if for every gate g k the following holds:
• if both players corresponding to the input bits of g k play their one strategy, then the gate player G k plays her zero strategy;
• if at least one of the players corresponding to the input bits of g k plays her zero strategy, then the gate player G k plays her one strategy.
We show that for the right choice of α, the set of α-PNE in G d µ is the same as the set of all strategy profiles where the gate players follow the NAND semantics.
Define
From our choice of µ, we obtain 3 d /2 − ε(µ) > 1. For any valid circuit C in canonical form and a valid choice of µ the following lemma holds for G d µ .
Lemma 1. Let s X be any strategy profile for the input players X 1 , . . . , X n and let x ∈ {0, 1} n be the bit vector represented by s X . For any µ > 1 + 3 d+ d /2 and any 1
where the input players play according to s X . In particular, in this α-PNE the gate players follow the NAND semantics, and the output player G 1 plays according to C(x).
Proof. Let µ > 1 + 3 d+ d /2 and α < 3 d /2 − ε(µ). First, we fix the input players to the strategies given by s X and show that in any α-PNE every gate player follows the NAND semantics, as otherwise changing to the strategy corresponding to the NAND of its input bits is an α-improving move. Second, we show that in any α-PNE where the gate players follow the NAND semantics, the input players have no incentive to change their strategy. In total we get that every strategy profile for the input players can be extended to an α-PNE, where the gate players emulate the circuit. Hence this α-PNE is unique.
Let s X be any strategy profile for the input players X 1 , . . . , X n and let s be an α-PNE of G d µ where the input players play according to s X . Take G k to be any of the gate players and let P a and P b be the players corresponding to the input bits of gate g k . Note that P a and P b can be other gate players or input players, and one of them can be the static player. To show that G k follows the NAND semantics we consider two cases. Case 1: Both P a and P b play their one strategy in s. As both P a and P b play resource 1 k and all three players P a , P b and G k are different, the cost of G k 's one strategy is at least
By the definition of λ (see (8)) and ε(µ) (see (9)), we obtain
Hence, changing from the one to the zero strategy would be an α-improving move for G k . Thus, G k must follow the NAND semantics and play her zero strategy in s. Case 2: At least one of P a or P b is playing her zero strategy in s. By similar arguments to the previous case, we obtain that the cost of G k 's zero strategy is at least c 0 k (2) and the cost of the one strategy is at most
. Then, we get that
By the definition of λ and ε(µ), we obtain
Hence, changing from the zero to the one strategy would be an α-improving move for G k . Thus, G k must follow the NAND semantics and play her one strategy in s. We just showed that, in an α-PNE, every gate player must follow the NAND semantics. This implies that there is at most one α-PNE where the input players play according to s X , since the NAND semantics uniquely define the strategy of the remaining players. To conclude the proof, we must argue that this yields in fact an α-PNE, meaning that the input players are also 'locked' to their strategies in s X and have no incentive to deviate. To that end, let s be a strategy profile PNE of G d µ where the gate players follow the NAND semantics and let X i be any of the input players. Recall that every input bit x i is connected to exactly one gate, say g k = g k(i) , while the other input is fixed to 1. To show that X i does not have an incentive to change her strategy, we consider two cases.
Case 1: X i plays her zero strategy in s. As G k follows the NAND semantics in s and the other input of g k is fixed to 1, we know that G k must be playing her one strategy. This incurs a cost of c 0 k (1) = λµ k to X i . On the other hand, if X i changed to her one strategy this would incur a cost of c 1 k (3) = µ k 3 d . Case 2: X i plays her one strategy in s. As G k follows the NAND semantics in s and the other input of g k is fixed to 1, we know that G k must be playing her zero strategy. Thus, incurring a cost of c 1 k (2) = µ k 2 d for X i . On the other hand, if X i changed to her zero strategy this would incur a cost of c 0 k (2) = λµ k 2 d .
In both cases it is α-dominating for X i not to change her strategy,
We are now ready to show our main result of this section; using the circuit game described above, we show NP-hardness of deciding whether approximate equilibria with additional properties exist. Theorem 2. The following problems are NP-hard, even for unweighted polynomial congestion games of degree d ≥ 2, for all α ∈ [1, 3 d /2 ) and all z > 0:
• "Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain subset of players are playing a specific strategy profile?"
• "Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain resource is used by at least one player?"
• "Does there exist an α-approximate PNE in which a certain player has cost at most z?"
Proof. For the first problem we reduce from Circuit Satisfiability: given a Boolean circuit with n input bits and one output bit, is there an assignment of the input bits where the output of the circuit is 1? This problem is NP-hard even for circuits consisting only of 2-input NAND gates [28] . Let C be a Boolean circuit of 2-input NAND gates. We transform C into a valid circuit C by connecting every input bit to a NOT gate and the output of this NOT gate to all gates connected to the input bit in C . Thus, C (x) = C(x), wherex denotes the vector obtained from x ∈ {0, 1} n by flipping every bit. Hence, we have that C is a YES-instance to Circuit Satisfiability if and only if C is a YES-instance. Let α ∈ [1, 3 d /2 ), then there is an ε > 0 with α < 3 d /2 − ε. We set µ = 1 + 3 d+ d /2 min{ε,1} . For this choice of µ, we obtain ε(µ) ≤ ε and thus 3 d /2 − ε(µ) ≥ 3 d /2 − ε > α. From the canonical form of C we construct 4 the game G d µ . The subset of players we are looking at is the output player G 1 and the specific strategy for G 1 is her one strategy s 1 G 1 . We show that there is an α-PNE where G 1 plays s 1 G 1 if and only if C is a YES-instance to Circuit Satisfiability. Suppose there is a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1} n such that C(x) = 1. Let s X be the strategy profile for the input players of G d µ corresponding to x. Since 3 d /2 − ε(µ) > α, Lemma 1 holds for G d µ and α. Hence, the profile s X can be extended to an α-PNE where G 1 plays according to C(x). Thus, there is an α-PNE where G 1 plays s 1 G 1 . On the other hand, suppose for all bit vectors x ∈ {0, 1} n it holds C(x) = 0. Again, by Lemma 1 we know that for any choice of strategies for the input players, the only α-PNE is a profile where the gate players follow the NAND semantics. Thus in this case, G 1 is playing s 0
To show NP-hardness of the second problem we reduce from the first part of this theorem. From the proof above we know that this problem is even NP-hard if the given subset of players consists only of one player. Let (G, P, s P ) be an instance of this problem, i.e. G is an unweighted polynomial congestion game of degree d, P is one of its players and s P is a specific strategy for P . We construct a new game G from G by adding a new resource r with cost 0 to the strategy 4 To be precise, the description of the game G d µ involves the quantities µ = 1 + 3 d+d/2 min{ε,1} and λ = 3 d/2 , which in general might be irrational. In order to incorporate this game into our reduction, it is enough to choose a rational µ such that µ > 1 + 3 d+d/2 min{ε,1} , and a rational λ such that α 1
In this way, G d µ is described entirely via rational numbers, while preserving the inequalities in (10) and (11) . s P . The rest of the game G stays unchanged. As r does not incur any cost, the set of α-PNE in G and G are the same. Thus, there exists an α-PNE in G where the resource r is used by at least one player if and only if there is an α-PNE in G where P plays s P . The hardness of the third problem is shown by a reduction from Circuit Satisfiability, similar to the proof for the first problem. For α ∈ [1, 3 d /2 ) we choose µ as before, so that Lemma 1 holds for α and the game G d µ for a suitable circuit. Let C be an instance of Circuit Satisfiability. By negating the output of C , we obtain a circuit C . As before we transform C to a valid circuit C, so that C (x) = ¬C(x) holds. From the canonical form of C we construct the game G d µ . Note that the output player G 1 of this game is the output of a gate, where one of the inputs is fixed to 1, as we negated the output of C by connecting the output of C to a NOT gate. We show that there is an α-PNE in G d µ , where G 1 has cost at most λµ, if and only if C is a YES-instance to Circuit Satisfiability.
Suppose there is a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1} n with C (x) = 1, then there is a vectorx with C(x) = 0. Let s X be the strategy profile for the input players of G d µ corresponding tox. By Lemma 1 this profile can be extended to an α-PNE, where G 1 is playing her zero strategy. As the gate players follow the NAND semantics in this PNE, the cost of player G 1 is exactly
If, on the other hand, for all bit vectors x ∈ {0, 1} n we have C (x) = 0, then for allx ∈ {0, 1} n we have C(x) = 1. Thus, using Lemma 1 we know that in every α-PNE G 1 plays her one strategy. As G 1 follows the NAND semantics in any α-PNE and the player corresponding to one of the inputs of g 1 is the static player, we obtain that the cost of G 1 is exactly c 1 1 (2) = µ2 d . Noticing that λ = 3 d /2 < 2 d , we have deduced the following: either C is a YES-instance, and G d µ has an α-PNE where G 1 has a cost of (at most) λµ; or C is a NO-instance, and for every α-PNE of G d µ , G 1 has a cost of (at least) 2 d µ. This immediately implies that determining whether an α-PNE exists in which a certain player has cost at most z is NP-hard for λµ < z < 2 d µ. To prove that the problem remains NP-hard for an arbitrary z > 0, simply take a rational c such that cλµ < z < c2 d µ and rescale all costs of the resources in G d µ by c.
Hardness of Existence
In this section we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether a polynomial congestion game has an α-PNE. For this we use a black-box reduction: our hard instance is obtained by combining any (weighted) polynomial congestion game G without α-PNE (i.e., the game from Section 3) with the circuit gadget of the previous section. To achieve this, it would be convenient to make some assumptions on the game G, which however do not influence the existence or nonexistence of approximate equilibria:
Structural Properties of G Without loss of generality, we assume that a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree d has the following structural properties.
• No player has an empty strategy. If, for some player i, ∅ ∈ S i , then this strategy would be α-dominating for i. Removing i from the game description would not affect the (non)existence of (approximate) equilibria 5 .
• No player has zero weight. If a player i had zero weight, her strategy would not influence the costs of the strategies of the other players. Again, removing i from the game description would not affect the (non)existence of equilibria.
• Each resource e has a monomial cost function with a strictly positive coefficient, i.e. c e (x) = a e x ke where a e > 0 and k e ∈ {0, . . . , d}. If a resource had a more general cost function c e (x) = a e,0 + a e,1 x + . . . + a e,d x d , we could split it into at most d + 1 resources with (positive) monomial costs, c e,0 (x) = a e,0 , c e,1 (x) = a e,1 x, . . . , c e,d (x) = a e,d x d . These monomial cost resources replace the original resource, appearing on every strategy that included e.
• No resource e has a constant cost function. If a resource e had a constant cost function c e (x) = a e,0 , we could replace it by new resources having monomial cost. For each player i of weight w i , replace resource e by a resource e i with monomial cost c e i (x) = a e,0
w i x, that is used exclusively by player i on her strategies that originally had resource e. Note that c e i (w i ) = a e,0 , so that this modification does not change the player's costs, neither has an effect on the (non)existence of approximate equilibria. If a resource has cost function constantly equal to zero, we can simply remove it from the description of the game.
For a game having the above properties, we define the (strictly positive) quantities
Note that c max is an upper bound on the cost of any player on any strategy profile.
Rescaling of G In our construction of the combined game we have to make sure that the weights of the players in G are smaller than the weights of the players in the circuit gadget. We introduce the following rescaling argument. For any γ ∈ (0, 1] define the gameG γ , where we rescale the player weights and resource cost coefficients in G asw
This changes the quantities in (12) forG γ as a min ≥ γ d a min ,W = γW,c max = γ d+1 c max .
InG γ the player costs are all uniformly scaled asC i (s) = γ d+1 C i (s), so that the Nash dynamics and the (non)existence of equilibria are preserved. The next lemma formalizes the combination of both game gadgets and, furthermore, establishes the gap-introduction in the equilibrium factor. Using it, we will derive our key hardness tool of Theorem 3.
Lemma 2.
Fix any integer d ≥ 2 and real α ≥ 1. Suppose there exists a weighted polynomial congestion game G of degree d that does not have an α-approximate PNE. Then, for any circuit C there exists a gameG C with the following property: the sets of α-approximate PNE and exact PNE ofG C coincide and are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of satisfying assignments of C. In particular, one of the following holds: either 1. C has a satisfying assignment, in which caseG C has an exact PNE (and thus, also an α-approximate PNE); or 2. C has no satisfying assignments, in which caseG C has no α-approximate PNE (and thus, also no exact PNE).
Proof. Let G be a congestion game as in the statement of the theorem having the above mentioned structural properties. Recalling that weighted polynomial congestion games of degree d have d-PNE [3] , this implies that α < d < 3 d /2 . Fix some 0 < ε < 3 d /2 − α and take µ ≥ 1 + 3 d+ d /2 min{ε,1} ; in this way α < Given a circuit C we construct the gameG C as follows. We combine the game G d µ whose Nash dynamics model the NAND semantics of C, as described in Section 4, with the gameG γ obtained from G via the aforementioned rescaling. We choose γ ∈ (0, 1] sufficiently small such that the following three inequalities hold for the quantities in (12) for G:
Thus, the set of players inG C corresponds to the (disjoint) union of the static, input and gate players in G d µ (which all have weights 1) and the players inG γ (with weightsw i ). We also consider a new dummy resource with constant cost c dummy (x) =ã min α . Thus, the set of resources corresponds to the (disjoint) union of the gate resources 0 k , 1 k in G d µ , the resources inG γ , and the dummy resource. We augment the strategy space of the players as follows:
• each input player or gate player of G d µ that is not the output player G 1 has the same strategies as in G d µ (i.e. either the zero or the one strategy);
• the zero strategy of the output player G 1 is the same as in G d µ , but her one strategy is augmented with every resource inG γ ; that is, s 1
• each player i inG γ keeps her original strategies as inG γ , and gets a new dummy strategy s i,dummy = {dummy}.
A graphical representation of the gameG C can be seen in Fig. 4 . To finish the proof, we need to show that every α-PNE ofG C is an exact PNE and corresponds to a satisfying assignment of C; and, conversely, that every satisfying assignment of C gives rise to an exact PNE ofG C (and thus, an α-PNE as well).
Suppose that s is an α-PNE ofG C , and let s X denote the strategy profile restricted to the input players of G d µ . Then, as in the proof of Lemma 1, every gate player that is not the output player must respect the NAND semantics, and this is an α-dominating strategy. For the output player, either s X is a non-satisfying assignment, in which case the zero strategy of G 1 was α-dominating, and this remains α-dominating in the gameG C (since only the cost of the one strategy increased for the output player); or s X is a satisfying assignment. In the second case, we now argue that the one strategy of G 1 remains α-dominating. The cost of the output player on the zero strategy is at least c 0 1 (2) = λµ2 d , and the cost on the one strategy is at most
where we used the first and second bounds from (14) . Thus, the ratio between the costs is at least
Given that the gate players must follow the NAND semantics, the input players are also locked to their strategies (i.e. they have no incentive to change) due to the proof of Lemma 1. The only players left to consider are the players fromG γ . First we show that, since s is an α-PNE, the output player must be playing her one strategy. If this was not the case, then each dummy strategy of a player inG γ is α-dominated by any other strategy: the dummy strategy incurs a cost ofã min α ≥ γ d a min α , whereas any other strategy would give a cost of at mostc max = γ d+1 c max (this is because the output player is not playing any of the resources inG γ ). The ratio between the costs is thus at least
Since the dummy strategies are α-dominated, the players inG γ must be playing on their original sets of strategies. The only way for s to be an α-PNE would be if G had an α-PNE to begin with, which yields a contradiction. Thus, the output player is playing the one strategy (and hence, is present in every resource inG γ ). In such a case, we can conclude that each dummy strategy is now α-dominating. If a player i inG γ is not playing a dummy strategy, she is playing at least one resource inG γ , say resource e. Her cost is at leastc e (1 +w i ) =ã e (1 +w i ) ke >ã e ≥ã min (the strict inequality holds since, by the structural properties of our game, all ofã e ,w i and k e are strictly positive quantities). On the other hand, the cost of playing the dummy strategy is a min α . Thus, the ratio between the costs is greater than α.
We have concluded that, if s is an α-PNE ofG C , then s X corresponds to a satisfying assignment of C, all the gate players are playing according to the NAND semantics, the output player is playing the one strategy, and all players ofG γ are playing the dummy strategies. In this case, we also have observed that each player's current strategy is α-dominating, so the strategy profile is an exact PNE. To finish the proof, we need to argue that every satisfying assignment gives rise to a unique α-PNE. Let s X be the strategy profile corresponding to this assignment for the input players in G d µ . Then, as before, there is one and exactly one α-PNE s inG C that agrees with s X ; namely, each gate player follows the NAND semantics, the output player plays the one strategy, and the players inG γ play the dummy strategies. Theorem 3. For any integer d ≥ 2 and real α ≥ 1, suppose there exists a weighted polynomial congestion game which does not have an α-approximate PNE. Then it is NP-hard to decide whether (weighted) polynomial congestion games of degree d have an α-approximate PNE. If in addition α is polynomial-time computable, 6 the aforementioned problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Let d ≥ 2 and α ≥ 1. Let G be a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree d that has no α-PNE; this means that for every strategy profile s there exists a player i and a strategy
. Note that the functions C i are polynomials of degree d and hence they are continuous on the weights w i and the coefficients a e appearing on the cost functions. Hence, any arbitrarily small perturbation of the w i , a e does not change the sign of the above inequality. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that all w i , a e are rational numbers. By a similar reasoning, we can letᾱ > α be a rational number sufficiently close to α such that G still does not have anᾱ-PNE.
Next, we consider the gameG γ obtained from G by rescaling, as in the proof of Lemma 2, but withᾱ playing the role of α. Notice that the rescaling is done via the choice of a sufficiently small γ, according to (14) , and hence in particular we can take γ to be a sufficiently small rational. In this way, all the player weights and coefficients in the cost of resources are rational numbers scaled by a rational number and hence rationals.
Finally, we are able to provide the desired NP reduction from Circuit Satisfiability. Given a Boolean circuit C built with 2-input NAND gates, transform it into a valid circuit C in canonical form. From C we can construct in polynomial time the gameG C as described in the proof of Lemma 2. The 'circuit part', i.e. the game G d µ , is obtained in polynomial time from C, as in the proof of Theorem 2; the description of the gameG γ involves only rational numbers, and hence the game can be represented by a constant number of bits (i.e. independent of the circuit C). Similarly, the additional dummy strategy has a constant delay ofãmin/ᾱ, and can be represented with a single rational number. Merging both G d µ andG γ into a single gameG C can be done in linear time. Since C has a satisfying assignment iffG C has an α-PNE (orᾱ-PNE), this concludes that the problem described is NP-hard.
If α is polynomial-time computable, the problem is clearly in NP: given a weighted polynomial congestion game of degree d and a strategy profile s, one can check if s is an α-PNE by computing the ratios between the cost of each player in s and their cost for each possible deviation, and comparing these ratios with α.
Combining the hardness result of Theorem 3 together with the nonexistence result of Theorem 1 we get the following corollary, which is the main result of this section. Notice that, in the proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 3, we constructed a polynomial-time reduction from Circuit Satisfiability to the problem of determining whether a given congestion game has an α-PNE. Not only does this reduction map YES-instances of one problem to YES-instances of the other, but it also induces a bijection between the sets of satisfying assignments of a circuit C and α-PNE of the corresponding gameG C . That is, this reduction is parsimonious. As a consequence, we can directly lift hardness of problems associated with counting satisfying assignments to Circuit Satisfiability into problems associated with counting α-PNE of congestion games:
is the same as in Theorem 1. Then
• it is #P-hard to count the number of α-approximate PNE of (weighted) polynomial congestion games of degree d;
• it is NP-hard to decide whether a (weighted) polynomial congestion game of degree d has at least k distinct α-approximate PNE.
Proof. The hardness of the first problem comes from the #P-hardness of the counting version of Circuit Satisfiability (see, e.g., [28, Ch. 18] ). For the hardness of the second problem, it is immediate to see that the following problem is NP-complete, for any fixed integer k ≥ 1: given a circuit C, decide whether there are at least k distinct satisfying assignments for C (simply add "dummy" variables to the description of the circuit).
General Cost Functions
In this final section we leave the domain of polynomial latencies and study the existence of approximate equilibria in general congestion games having arbitrary (nondecreasing) cost functions. Our parameter of interest, with respect to which both our positive and negative results are going to be stated, is the number of players n. We start by showing that n-PNE always exist:
Theorem 4. Every weighted congestion game with n players and arbitrary (nondecreasing) cost functions has an n-approximate PNE.
Proof. Fix a weighted congestion game with n ≥ 2 players, some strategy profile s, and a possible deviation s i of player i. First notice that we can bound the change in the cost of any other player j = i as
the first inequality holding due to the fact that the second sum in (15) contains only nonpositive terms (since the latency functions are nondecreasing). Next, define the social cost C(s) = i∈N C i (s). Adding the above inequality over all players j = i (of which there are n − 1) and rearranging, we successively derive:
We conclude that, if s i is an n-improving deviation for player i (i.e., nC i (s i , s −i ) < C i (s)), then the social cost must strictly decrease after this move. Thus, any (global or local) minimizer of the social cost must be an n-PNE (the existence of such a minimizer is guaranteed by the fact that the strategy spaces are finite).
The above proof not only establishes the existence of n-approximate equilibria in general congestion games, but also highlights a few additional interesting features. First, due to the key inequality (17) , n-PNE are reachable via sequences of n-improving moves, in addition to arising also as minimizers of the social cost function. These attributes give a nice "constructive" flavour to Theorem 4. Secondly, exactly because social cost optima are n-PNE, the Price of Stability 7 of n-PNE is optimal (i.e., equal to 1) as well. Another, more succinct way, to interpret these observations is within the context of approximate potentials (see, e.g., [6, 8, 9] ); (17) establishes that the social cost itself is always an n-approximate potential of any congestion game.
Next, we design a family of games that do not admit Θ n ln n -PNE, thus nearly matching the upper bound Theorem 4. Proof. For any integer n ≥ 2, let ξ = Φ n−1 be the positive solution of (x + 1) n−1 = x n . Then, equivalently,
Furthermore, as we mentioned in Section 2, ξ > 1 and asymptotically Φ n−1 ∼ n ln n . Consider the following congestion game G n . There are n = m + 1 players 0, 1, . . . , m, where player i has weight w i = 1 /2 i . In particular, this means that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , m}: m k=i w k < w i−1 ≤ w 0 . Furthermore, there are 2(m + 1) resources a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m , b 0 , b 1 , . . . , b m , where resources a i and b i have the same cost function c i given by
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m},
The strategy set of player 0 and of all players i ∈ {1, . . . , m} are, respectively,
We show that this game has no α-PNE, for any α < ξ, by proving that in any outcome there is at least one player that can deviate and improve her cost by a factor of at least ξ. Due to symmetry it is sufficient to consider the following two kinds of outcomes: Case 1: Player 0 is alone on resource a 0 . Then player 0 must have chosen {a 0 , . . . , a m }, and all other players i ∈ {1, . . . , m} must have chosen strategy {b 0 , . . . , b i−1 , a i }. In this outcome, player 0 has a cost of
where the last equality follows by the fact that m = n − 1 and (18) . Deviating to {b 0 , . . . , b m }, player 0 would get a cost of
Thus player 0 can improve by a factor of at least ξ. Case 2: Player 0 is sharing resource a 0 with at least one other player. Let j be the smallest index of such a player, i.e., player j plays {a 0 , . . . , a j−1 , b j } and all players i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} have chosen strategy {b 0 , . . . , b i−1 , a i }. In such a profile the cost of player j is at least
while deviating to j's other strategy would result in a cost of at most
Thus player j can improve by a factor of at least ξ.
Similar to the spirit of the rest of our paper so far, we'd like to show an NP-hardness result for deciding existence of α-PNE for general games as well. We do exactly that in the following theorem, where now α grows asΘ(n). Again, we use the circuit gadget and combine it with the game from the previous nonexistence Theorem 5. The main difference to the previous reductions is that now n is part of the input. On the other hand we are not restricted to polynomial latencies, so we use step functions having a single breakpoint. Theorem 6. Let ε > 0, and letα : N ≥2 −→ R be any sequence of reals such that 1 ≤α(n) <
ln m is the unique positive solution of (x + 1) m = x m+1 . Then, it is NP-hard to decide whether a (weighted) congestion game with n players has anα(n)-approximate PNE. If in additionα is a polynomial-time computable real sequence (as defined in Section 2), the aforementioned problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Recall that we have Φ n−1 ∼ n ln n . Given ε > 0, without loss of generality assume ε < 1, so that 1 + ε /3 < (1 + ε)(1 − ε /3). Let n 0 , ∈ N be large enough natural numbers such that
We will again reduce from Circuit Satisfiability: given a circuit C, we must construct (in polynomial time) a gameG, say withñ players, that has anα(ñ)-PNE if and only if C has a satisfying assignment. Without loss of generality assume that C is in canonical form (as described in Section 4); add also one extra gate that negates the output of C, making this the new output of a circuitC, say with m inputs and K NAND gates. Let s = m + K + 1, n = s, and take a large enough integer d such that 3 d /2 > Φ n−1 . Note that s, n and a suitable d can all be found in time polynomial in the description of C. To conclude the preliminaries of this proof, assume also without loss of generality that s ≥ n 0 ; if s is bounded by a constant, determining whether C has a satisfying assignment can be done in constant time.
Next, givenC and d, construct the game G d µ where µ is such that 3 d /2 − ε(µ) > Φ n−1 , as in Section 4. Notice that G d µ can be computed in polynomial time from C, and that the Φ n−1 -improving Nash dynamics of this game emulate the computation of the circuit. Consider also the game G n with n players from Theorem 5 that does not have α-PNE for any α < Φ n−1 .
We would like to merge G d µ and G n into a single gameG, in such a way thatG has an approximate PNE if and only if C has a satisfying assignment. Following the same technique as in Lemma 2, we would like to extend the strategies of the output player of G d µ to include resources that are used by players in G n . For this technique to work, we must rescale the weights and cost functions in G n . In particular, we divide all weights of the players in G n by 2 (so that the sum of the weights of all the players is less than 1) and halve the breakpoints of the cost functions accordingly. We also add a new dummy resource with cost function
We are now ready to describe the congestion gameG that is obtained by merging the circuit game G d µ with the (rescaling of) game G n . Note that this game has n + s = ( + 1)s players: s from the circuit game (which all have weight 1) and n from the nonexistence gadget. The set of resources corresponds to the union of the gate resources of G d µ , the resources in G n , and the dummy resource. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 2,
• we do not change the strategies of the players in G d µ , with the exception of the output player G 1 ;
• the zero strategy of the output player G 1 remains the same as in G d µ , but her one strategy is augmented with the dummy resource; that is, s 1 G 1 = {1 1 , dummy};
• each player i in G n keeps her original strategies, and gets a new dummy strategy s i,dummy = {dummy}.
With the above description, 8 the only thing left to prove NP-hardness is that C has a satisfying assignment if and only ifG has anα(n + s)-PNE. The proof follows the same approach as in Lemma 2. Letting α < Φ n−1 , we suppose thatG has an α-PNE, say s, and proceed to prove that C has a satisfying assignment.
As before, if s is an α-PNE, then every gate player that is not the output player must respect the NAND semantics, and this strategy is α-dominating. For the output player, the cost of her zero strategy remains the same, and the cost of her one strategy increases by exactly Φ 2 n−1 < 3 d < µ µ−1 3 d . Hence, if s X is a satisfying assignment, then the zero strategy of the output player (which negates the output of the original circuit C) remains α-dominating; on the other hand, if s X is not a satisfying assignment, then the ratio between the costs of the zero strategy and the one strategy of the output player is at least
Hence, respecting the NAND semantics remains α-dominating for the output player as well. As a consequence, the input players are also locked to their strategies (i.e. they have no incentive to change). Now, if the output player happened to be playing her one strategy, this could not be an α-PNE. For each of the players in G n , the dummy strategy would incur a cost of Φ 2 n−1 , whereas any other strategy would give a cost of at most Φ n−1 . Thus the dummy strategy would be Φ n−1 -dominated, and the players in G n must be playing on their original sets of strategies, for which we know that α-PNE do not occur.
The above argument proves that, in an α-PNE, the output player must be playing her zero strategy. Since the output player, by construction, negates the output of C, this implies that C must have a satisfying assignment. This also implies that the congestion on the dummy resource cannot reach the breakpoint of 1, and hence it would be α-dominating for each of the players in G n to play her dummy strategy (and incur a cost of 0). Thus, s is an exact PNE as well.
For the converse direction, suppose C has a satisfying assignment s X . Then this can be extended to an α-PNE ofG in which the input players play according to s X , the gate players play according to the NAND semantics, the output player of G d µ plays the zero strategy, and each player in G n plays the dummy strategy.
We have proven that, for any α < Φ n−1 , C has a satisfying assignment iffG has an α-PNE. To conclude the proof, we verify thatα(n + s) < Φ n−1 : 
The first inequality comes from the assumption onα, the second and third come from the upper and lower bounds on Φ n from (19) and the fact that n + s ≥ n ≥ s ≥ n 0 , the fourth comes from the trivial bound ln n < ln(n + s), the equality comes from the definition of n = s, and the final step comes from the choice of in (19) . We conclude that the problem of deciding whether a (weighted) congestion game with n players has anα(n)-PNE is NP-hard. If in additionα is a polynomial-time computable real sequence, the problem is also in NP; given a game with n players and a (candidate) strategy profile, verify that this is anα(n)-PNE by iterating over all possible moves of all players and verifying that none of these areα(n)-improving.
Discussion and Future Directions
In this paper we showed that weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of degree d do not have α-PNE for α < α(d) = Ω √ d ln d . For general cost functions, we proved that n-PNE always exist whereas α-PNE in general do not, where n is the number of players and α < Φ n−1 = Θ n ln n . We also transformed the nonexistence results into complexity-theoretic results, establishing that deciding whether such α-PNE exist is itself an NP-hard problem.
We now identify two possible directions for follow-up work. A first obvious question would be to reduce the nonexistence gap between Ω √ d ln d (derived in Theorem 1 of this paper) and d (shown in [3] ) for polynomials of degree d; similarly for the gap between Θ n ln n (Theorem 5) and n (Theorem 4) for general cost functions and n players. Notice that all current methods for proving upper bounds (i.e., existence) are essentially based on potential function arguments; thus it might be necessary to come up with novel ideas and techniques to overcome the current gaps.
A second direction would be to study the complexity of finding α-PNE, when they are guaranteed to exist. For example, for polynomials of degree d, we know that d-improving dynamics eventually reach a d-PNE [3] , and so finding such an approximate equilibrium lies in the complexity class PLS of local search problems (see, e.g., [21, 32] ). However, from a complexity theory perspective the only known lower bound is the PLS-completeness of finding an exact equilibrium for unweighted congestion games [12] (and this is true even for d = 1, i.e., affine cost functions; see [1] ). On the other hand, we know that d O(d) -PNE can be computed in polynomial time (see, e.g., [5, 13, 16] ). It would be then very interesting to establish a "gradation" in complexity (e.g., from NP-hardness to PLS-hardness to P) as the parameter α increases from 1 to d O(d) .
